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Abstract 
The objective of this study to examine the effect of board diversity on corporate social disclosure, in which case 
the board diversity is proxied by board age, board gender, board independence, board size and board tenure. 
Testing were conducted at public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange that disclose corporate social 
responsibility in annual report or sustainability report during the period of 2010-2012 using multiple regression 
analysis.  The results showed that board age and board size have significant positive effect on corporate social 
disclosure.  Board gender and board tenure have significant negative effect on corporate social disclosure, while 
board independency doesn’t affect on it.  The research findings indicate the dominance of older boards group are 
able to respond to the interest of diverse stakeholders, and larger board represents the more experience, 
knowledge, skill and insight to better encourage ethical corporate behavior.  Long tenure board and gender 
composition in board member need to be scrutinized in their role to lead the strategy and policies related to 
sustainability issues.  The longer board tenure can reduce the effectiveness of the oversight functions to 
executive behaviors and have negative consequences on governance, in ensuring equality in the relationship 
between stakeholders.  Meanwhile, the existence and the low number of female board in the corporate board 
without adequate expertise or experience are unable to encourage altruistic behavior and better perspective to 
ethical and environmental concerns.  
Keywords : board diversity, board of commissioner, corporate social disclosure  
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies need to be considered as a crucial part of the corporate strategy. 
The growing complexity of the corporate operations policy, the social and environmental concern becomes a 
critical issue for the stakeholders and large society.  Disclosure of corporate social responsibility as a corporate 
strategy has been carried out by many large companies (Lopez & Romero, 2012), so that the development of non 
financial reporting such as corporate social disclosure is a challenge that non financial information can be 
integrated into a part of corporate business strategy.  In the adoption of CSR reporting, the board of directors 
have crucial role to decide CSR’s strategy and policy (Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2012). Indonesian country adhere 
two-tier board system in corporate governance that separates the position and duties of the board of management 
as the manager of the company, and the board of commissioner as component to perform the oversight function 
of management.  Therefore, board of director in this study refers to the role of board of commissioners in 
corporate social disclosure policies.   
Board responsibility was to protect the corporate stakeholder interest, and this is the reason that boards 
should consist of members who represent their stakeholder interest (Huse & Rindova, 2001).  The various 
interest between stakeholder require ethical obligations of the board of directors, which is embodied in the 
structure, board independence and board size (Howton et al., 2008).  Board activities can be directed to balance 
the financial incentives and incentives to support responsible behavior, because the more balance incentives will 
reduce conflict and allow a better focus on long-term value creation (MacKenzie, 2007). To be able to represent 
the needs and interest of diverse stakeholder, a crucial role of board of commissioner should have a diversity of 
perspectives that leads not only on short-term orientation with regard to financial performance, but also in the 
long-term corporate sustainability.   
The diversity and composition of board of commissioners with skill, knowledge, background and expertise 
are necessary to improve the quality of decision-making, policy and CSR strategy in board level (Strandberg, 
2005; Mackenzie, 2007). Lack of diversity and homogeneous boards tend to be an important factor leading to 
failure and weakness of governance in general. Instead, the board diversity showed an increased representation 
of moral and ethical views in the decision-making process, reduce myopic decision making, enhance new ideas 
and better problem solving, and also improve corporate strategic planning and accountability (Arfken et al., 
2004).  Representation of board diversity could encourage ethical corporate culture and reduce fraud so as to 
decrease agency cost (Corkery & Taylor, 2012).  Board diversity also leads to an increasing of better 
understanding of the company’s market position, creativity and innovation as well as more effective problem 
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solving (Carter et al., 2003). Furthermore, board diversity can revise global relationship more effectively and 
increase the independence of board, due to differences in gender, ethnicity or cultural background can provide 
insight and better perspective (Arfken et al., 2004).  
The objective of this study to explore the role of board diversity in improving the quality of decision-
making, as well as policy formulation and corporate social responsibility strategy, particularly in public firms in 
Indonesia. Formulation of strategies and policies in the boardroom should not only orientate to profit 
achievement for shareholder, but ignore the interests of all the stakeholders.  This study contributes to the 
importance of diversity to the widening role of board of commissioners in carrying out their duties not only 
focus on short-term financial performance and benefit the interest of a particular stakeholder group, but also 
must be able to ensure the equality relationship among all corporate’s stakeholders in long-term sustainability. 
The practical implication of this study provides a valuable contribution on the need of enhancing board diversity 
in the structure, characteristic and qualifications in the boardroom for long-term corporate sustainability in 
corporate social responsibility implementation.   
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1. Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory provides a perspective that the organization seeks to control external 
environment by choosing the resources needed to keep survive (Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) quoted from Osemeke, 
2012).  In line with this argument, Lynall et al. (2003) stated that company is open system that is influenced by 
external environment to be able survive, and boards have important role in establishing the relationship between 
the company and its environment.  The selection of resources has important implications in the role and structure 
of the board, because boards can be used as a mechanism to establish the corporate relationship with external 
environment (Duztas, 2008), and also provide more resources information and legitimacy for corporate (Johnson 
et al., 1996).  Corporate boards are part of set resources that can bring knowledge, experience, ideas and 
professional relationship (Carpenter et al., 2004), which provide resources for corporate diversity (Hilman & 
Dalziel, 2003) and is able to take resources from external environmental in managing external stakeholders 
(Pffeffer, 1972).  Another argument reveals that a set of experiences boards is able to bridge the connection 
between corporate relationships with external parties and large society (Selsky & Parker, 2005; Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996) as well as strengthening company relationship with its stakeholders and other external 
environment in maintaining corporate sustainability. 
2.2. Board Diversity 
Board diversity has significant implications for the dynamics of board (Kruger, 2007).  Diversity will 
produce cognitive conflict (such as the conflict in opinion, knowledge and perspectives) that can improve the 
quality of decisions related to interpretations, alternatives and consequences in broader perspectives (Miliken & 
Martins, 1996).  Board diversity leads to competence in processes and increase the value in the board discussions 
(Carter et al, 2003), and will enrich the quality of decision-making and oversight functions by providing higher 
quality analysis (Fairfax, 2005).  Diversity in corporate boardroom, such as the characteristics, qualifications and 
board affiliations, leads to increase the complexity interaction of board membership need to be explored for the 
fruitfulness of board management (Ruigrok et al., 2007).   
Dimension or attribute of diversity can be classified in task-related and relations-oriented (Jackson et al., 
2003).  Relations-oriented dimensions include age, gender and nationality differences; while educational and 
functional background and tenure related to diversity in task-related dimension.  Miliken & Martins (1996) and 
Williams & O’Reilly (1998) describes the task-related diversity positively connected to cognitive aspect and 
consequences of signaling (such as creativity, innovation and better image), while relations-orientation leads to a 
form of negative communication and affective consequences (such as poor decision-making, misunderstandings 
and conflicts).  Diversity in the composition of the board can be measured using demographic aspect such as 
gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, educational background, industry experience and organizational membership 
(Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008).  Meanwhile, another argument (Kang et al., 2007; Erhardt et al., 2003) 
revealed the diversity of corporate board representing the demographics as well as cognitive elements such as 
industry experience, professional qualifications and educations.  The need to consider multiple diversity 
dimensions should be applied in the context of corporate boards (Jackson et al., 2003), because the board 
responsibility is to protect the stakeholder interest so that boards should be able to reflect the diversity among 
corporate stakeholders.  
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Board Age  
Board age is an important consideration in determining the composition of the boards, particularly in 
formulating policies and strategies to ensure the diversity interest of corporate stakeholders. Board’s generation 
gap dominantly influence on the breadth of experience (Herrmann & Data, 2005), differences in strategy, 
decision-making, such as risk aversion and openness to technologies adaptation (Nyirenda, 2010). Older board of 
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commissioner shows richer experience and more practice, as a form of accumulation of skill-based competencies. 
Group of senior board or older age board can provide the experience and better policies relating to the use of 
economic resources, while the middle age group of boards has better orientation related to responsibility within 
organization and society (Houle, 1990).  On the other side, the younger age of board group have a lot more 
energy in driving the company successes and future planning.  The prior study found board by the age of 56 
years (age of board of directors is the most widely in the European context) tend to implement governance 
structures and processes relating to environmental (Post et al., 2011).  Different of age groups are expected to not 
only have orientation and perspectives of short term performance, but also to represent a wider long term 
perspectives of the diverse interest of corporate stakeholders. The dominance of older commissioners will be 
able to encourage the implementation of policies and strategies for corporate social responsibility.  
H1 : The higher the proportion of older age board, the higher the extent of corporate social disclosure  
2.2.2. Board Gender 
The existence and increasing the board gender was positively correlated with increased attention to ethical 
issue and the environment (Larkin et al., 2012; Bernardi & Threadgill, 2010; Bear et al., 2010; Bernardi et al., 
2009). The role of gender board can improve the effectiveness of corporate governance through the using of 
capital resources and better role of institution, a better fair business and reflect the existence of stakeholders 
(Tejersen et al., 2009).  The higher number of women on corporate boards tend to altruism attitude that leads to 
better social behavior (Kruger, 2010), such as donations, involvement with environmental and labor relations 
(Bernardi & Threadgill, 2010).  Companies that have at least three women in board members donate CSR funds 
more than 28% compared to companies without female board members (Mullen, 2011), because gender diversity 
can improve the quality of decision-making process and provide more attention to ethical issues and 
environmental issues (Bernardi & Threadgill, 2010).  Gender composition of the board of commissioner can 
encourage more attention to ethical and environmental concerns, so it can have a positive impact on the 
improvement of corporate social performance. 
H2 : The higher the number of female board, the higher the extent of corporate social disclosure  
2.2.3. Board Independence 
The existence of outside directors and independent board of directors may affect the corporate voluntary 
disclosure (Rao et al., 2012; Lim et al., 2007; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), because outside directors play an 
important role in establish and oversee the corporate policy on voluntary disclosure (Ajinkya et al., 2005).  
Increasing the proportion of outside directors on board member is associated with improved quality of 
information and acquisition of information proactively (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007). The composition of 
board of directors is positively related to voluntary disclosure (mainly related to social and environmental issues) 
in the corporate annual report, and independent boards provide more voluntary disclosure about progressive and 
strategic information (Lim et al., 2007). Increasing the proportion of outside directors will lead to better 
environmental performance (Uwuigbe et al., 2011) and better philanthropy consciousness than insiders (Dunn & 
Sainty, 2009).  Increasing the number of independent board will be effective in monitoring and ensuring 
management actions in carrying out social activities that are consistent with corporate stakeholder interest.   
H3 : The higher the proportion of board independence, the higher the extent of corporate social disclosure  
2.2.4.  Board Size  
Board size is the number of the board of commissioner who worked on corporate boards. Large numbers of 
boards (larger board) are less effective than smaller boards (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). When the numbers of 
board are too large will increase agency problem, because some boards can be free riders (Uwuigbe et al., 2011).  
Smaller boards will be able to be managed well and more often play a role in controlling than larger boards that 
are not able to function effectively (Chaganti et al., 1985).  However, that number is too small boards have less 
advantage in providing expert advice and opinion in the boardroom discussion boards than in larger board 
numbers.  A different view reveals that a larger board members are expected to provide experienced boards are 
able to represent the richer values and diverse in boards (Halme & Huse, 1997).  Larger boards tend to correlate 
with improvement of board diversity associated with the experience, skills, gender and nationality (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005). This indicates the presence of larger boards bring more experience and knowledge, and can 
provide better recommendation for corporate.  The larger board member will represent a broad diversity, rich 
experience, skills and knowledge so as to make decisions may reflect diversity among the corporate stakeholders.  
The equality of relationship among corporate stakeholders leads to long-term corporate sustainability. 
H4 : The greater the number of board size, the higher the extent of corporate social disclosure  
2.2.5. Board Tenure  
Studies on board tenure still limited and provide contradictory evidence regarding to the impact of tenure 
on corporate boards.  Expertise hypothesis and management friendliness hypothesis (Vafeas, 2003) explains that 
long-term board will provide better knowledge about the company and its business environment changes.  On the 
other hand, close relationships with management would make the board less effective in monitoring management 
behavior.  Berberich & Niu (2011) found long tenure board has negative consequences for governance, because 
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of the lack of effective oversight of executives. Long-term relationship between the boards of directors and 
executives will increase agency problem and lower the board’s oversight function on executives (Byrd et al., 
2010).  Different argumentation found in several studies that long tenure would make board tend to be more 
critical than shorter board tenure (Bebchuk et al., 2005), due to the high board tenure reflects better experience, 
skills and expertise (Kruger, 2010).  Long tenure board will be increasing the frequency of board interaction and 
higher frequency of board information exchange (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007).   Companies with a substantial 
high tenure indicate the lower social negative impact, because board is more interested in corporate long-term 
success and establish good relationship with the workers (Kruger, 2010).  The longer board tenure will provide 
better experience and understanding to corporate business environment, so as to lead to the better long-term 
strategy and policy for corporate sustainability.  
H5 : The longer board tenure, the higher the extent of corporate social disclosure  
 
3. Research Metodology 
Testing of analysis was held on public firms in Indonesia Stock Exchange that disclose CSR on annual 
report or sustainability report for the year of 2010-2012.  Total sample of 152 companies obtained through 
purposive sampling by removing financial and insurance sector, and so there are 456 observations. Board 
diversity as an independent variable is proxied by board age, board gender, board independency, board size and 
board tenure. Board age is measured by the proportion of older board of commissioner to the total number of 
board member (Post et al., 2011; Darmadi, 2010; Kang et al., 2007), whereas board gender was measured by the 
number of women in corporate board (Bear et al., 2010; Ruigrok et al., 2007).  Board independence was 
measured by the proportion of independent directors on board member (Dunn & Sainty, 2009; Lim et al., 2007; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), while board size was measured by the number of board member (Marlin & Geiger, 
2011), whereas board tenure is measured by an average terms (years) board working in the company (Kruger, 
2010; Marlin & Geiger, 2011).     
Corporate social disclosure is a dependent variable measured using CSR index based on indicators of 
Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI).  CSR disclosures items refer to the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI G3.1) 
consist of 82 items consist of indicators performance of economic (9 items), environmental (30 items), labor 
practices and decent work (15 items), human right (11 items), society (8 items) and product responsibility (9 
items). CSR disclosure index (CSRD) is calculated by dividing the number of CSR items disclosed by company 
to expected disclosure of CSR number, refers to Haniffa and Cooke (2002).  Analysis were performed by 
empirical model as follows :   
CSRDit=β0+β1 Board_Ageit +β2 Board_Genderit +β3 Board_Indepit +β4 Board_Sizeit+β5 Board_Tenure it+ ε i 
The research model presented in figure 1 below : 
 
 
4. Result and Discussion  
The results of descriptive statistics are presented in table 1 below. Based on descriptive statistics can be seen that 
the average value of corporate social disclosure (CSRD) is 0.2925. It means that corporate social disclosure 
index is relatively low in the public firms in Indonesia. Board size has an average of 4.71 or almost 5 persons in 
the corporate board for each company that indicates the amount is not too large. Meanwhile, the board gender 
has an average value of 0.411 which indicates the number of women in a number of board members is relatively 
low or less than 1 person. Board age have an average value of 0.676 which indicates the proportion of older 
commissioner in board members relatively high in board members, while the average board tenure is 6.27 which 
indicates long tenure of entanglement board of commissioners in corporate board, exceeds the tenure of board 
commissioners of Indonesian public companies are generally between 3 to 5 years. The proportion of 
independent board commissioners showed an average of 0.4008 or 40 % of board of commissioners in board 
member are independent board, which meets the Indonesia capital market requirements which requires at least 
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30 % of board of commissioners should be an independent commissioner. Meanwhile, the average level of 
corporate social disclosure is 0.2925 which relatively indicates the low disclosure index of CSR. 
Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Board_Size 456 2.00 13.00 4.7105 1.93055 
Board_Gender 455 .00 3.00 .4110 .66727 
Board_Age 456 .00 1.00 .0676 .05904 
Board_Tenure 456 .17 22.33 6.2769 4.28938 
Board_Indep 456 .15 1.00 .4008 .11065 
CSRD 456 .00 1.00 .2925 .21020 
Valid N (listwise) 456     
Before conducting regression analysis, first tested the model assumption for the result obtained are not 
biased; consists of normality test, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation test.  The test result 
showed that all independent variable have Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value below 10, so that all of 
independent variable are non multicollinearity.  Testing normality of Anderson Darling test showed that value 
0.2497>0.05 indicates normality assumption fulfilled.  Testing of Durbin Watson (DW) showed the value of DW 
is 1.81 which lies between the value of dU (1.78) and 4-dU (2.22) so that it can be concluded that the assumption 
of non autocorrelation fulfilled.  However, the homoscedasticity assumption using Breush Pagan Godfrey test 
indicates the occurrence of heteroscedastic, since the value of Prob Obs *R Square (0.000)<0.05 which indicates 
heteroscedastic problems due to the correlation between the magnitude of the residual data.  
The existence of heteroscedasticity in the empirical model will lead estimator obtained from the result 
of the regression analysis are no longer efficient so that the conclusion drawn will be biased and misleading.  
Therefore, measure of treatment (remedial measure) is needed to solve the problem by correcting 
heteroscedasticity standard error obtained from OLS regression analysis model.  Standard error have been 
corrected is referred to as White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standards errors or also known as robust standard 
errors. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis proposed in this study was tested through regression analysis by the 
method of OLS with White’s procedure to obtain heteroscedasticity consistent standards errors.  The result of 
goodness of fit model and hypothesis testing are presented in table 2 below.  
Table 2 : Result of Multiple Linear  Regression  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
      
      C 0.011695 0.127421 0.091784 0.9269  
BOARD_AGE 1.943213 1.144536 1.697817 0.0902  * 
BOARD_GENDER -0.020072 0.009391 -2.137417 0.0331  ** 
BOARD_INDEP -0.025894 0.045347 -0.571011 0.5683  
BOARD_SIZE 0.045884 0.006873 6.676300 0.0000  ** 
BOARD_TENURE -0.007657 0.003519 -2.175972 0.0301  ** 
      
      R-squared 0.488835     Mean dependent var 0.292456  
Adjusted R-squared 0.483155     S.D. dependent var 0.210195  
S.E. of regression 0.151114     Akaike info criterion -0.928500  
Sum squared resid 10.27588     Schwarz criterion -0.874257  
Log likelihood 217.6981     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.907133  
F-statistic 86.06825     Durbin-Watson stat 1.805999  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     
*; ** = statistically significant at 0,1 and 0,05 
Based on the result of regression analysis can be seen in table 2, goodness of fit model is indicated by 
Adjusted R-Squared value of 0.4832 or 48.32%; which means that the variance of corporate social disclosure 
(CSRD) is affected by board independent variable (board age, board gender, board independence, board size and 
board tenure) of 48,32%.  Result of hypothesis testing showed the board age and board size significantly positive 
effect on corporate social disclosure, while the board gender and board tenure significantly negative effect on it.  
However, board independence has no significant effect on corporate social disclosure. This findings indicate that 
only hypothesis 3 is not supported, while hypothesis 1,2,4 and 5 are supported. The following is a discussion of 
research findings.  
4.1.The Effect of Board Age on Corporate Social Disclosure  
The result of this study indicated that board age showed positive effect on corporate social disclosure.  This 
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proves that age diversity is positively related to philanthropy organization (Siciliano, 1996). These findings 
indicate that domination of generation differences on board influence on differences in decision making 
strategies, such as risk aversion and openness to technology adaptation (Nyirenda, 2010).  Older board showed 
extensive experience (Hermann & Data, 2005) and richer practices as a form of accumulation of skill based 
competencies (Darmadi, 2010).  This study supports the findings of Kang et al. (2007) and Post et al. (2011) that 
the role of older board is important and more desirable than the dynamics of the companies and new ideas of 
younger group of board.  Older group of boards tend to implement the board’s structure and governance 
processes relating to environmental (Post et al., 2011).  Group of older age commissioner above 50 years old, an 
age of group that dominates the board of commissioner of public firms in Indonesia, tend to make better social 
policies and strategies. Older board of commissioner more interested in long term sustainability and building 
good relations with community and environment.   
4.2. The Effect of Board Gender on Corporate Social Disclosure  
The result of this study showed that the increasing number of women on the corporate board doesn’t have 
positive impact on the improvement of corporate social disclosure.  Therefore, this result don’t support the 
finding of prior study (Larkin et al., 2012; Bernardi & Threadgill, 2010; Bear et al., 2010) which stated that the 
existence and the increasing number of women on corporate boards of commissioner strongly correlated with 
increased attention to ethical and environmental problems.  The result of this study also did not support the study 
of Kruger (2010) that higher number of women in boards with regard to altruism attitude leads to better social 
behavior.  This finding indicates that the low number of women on corporate boards (less than 1 person) is not 
able to give better attention to stakeholder welfare and encourage better corporate behavior on social and 
environmental issues.  This argument is consistent with Mullen (2011) that the company has at least three 
women in board member have stronger CSR program and donate 28% more CSR funds.  Condition in Indonesia 
shows a public firms is mainly controlled by the family (Claessens et al., 2000), and the presence of more 
women in board member driven by family-ties to control the shareholder rather than for reason of their expertise 
or experience (Darmadi, 2010).  The low number of gender composition on corporate boards in Indonesian 
public firms and lack of competence of female board was not able to encourage and to improve corporate ethical 
behavior, including in CSR strategy and corporate policy formulation so that it can have negative impact on 
corporate social performance.  
4.3. The Effect of Board Independence on Corporate Social Disclosure. 
The result of hypothesis testing showed that the presence of an independent board doesn’t affect the 
corporate social disclosure.  This finding didn’t support the study of Lim et al. (2007) and Haniffa & Cooke 
(2002) that the proportion of non executive director significantly related to an area of voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports.  The proportion of independent board is expected to be effective in monitoring and 
ensuring management on disclosing social information consistent with stakeholder interest.  Despite the fact that 
the higher composition of independent board on corporate board member do not always have a high commitment 
on corporate social responsibility implementation. These findings implicitly indicate that the oversight function 
of independent board of commissioner leads to more profit-oriented to meet the shareholder interest, rather than 
another stakeholders interest for corporate sustainability. Regulation on the provision of 30% of corporate 
commissioner should be an independent board set in the guidelines and regulation of Indonesia Stock Exchange 
Commission for listed corporation.  In addition to the Act number 40 of 2007 on Limited (Ltd) Corporation is 
explicitly stated that the board of commissioner elected by shareholder through Annual General Meeting (AGM).  
Therefore, it implies boards in carrying out their duty would prefer shareholder than stakeholder interest.  These 
conditions also indicate that the presence of independent board of commissioner in corporate governance of 
Indonesian public firms, more driven by regulatory pressures reason rather than accountability aspect in meeting 
the corporate stakeholder interest, and this condition can impact negatively on CSR implementation.    
4.4. The Effect of Board Size on Corporate Social Disclosure 
The result of this study showed that board size has positive effect on corporate social disclosure.  This 
finding support the study of Halme & Huse (1997) and Dalton & Dalton (2005) that the board members who can 
provide a greater number of experienced boards are able to represent more richer and diverse values.  Meanwhile, 
too small board numbers have less advantage in providing expert recommendation and opinion in the boardroom 
than discussion in larger quantities boards (Chaganti et al., 1985).  Nevertheless, the result of this study do not 
support the findings of Hermalin & Weisbach (2003) and Uwuigbe et al. (2011) who argues a large number of 
boards are less effective and can improve agency problem.  Larger boards are considered less effective in 
corporate negative impact on society, as the result of the high cost of coordination and communication, and 
board less actives in social roles.  Nevertheless, the presence of larger boards increasingly correlated with 
breadth of experience, skill and knowledge, and can provide better recommendation for the company, including 
in setting strategy and policy formulation as corporate social disclosure. These results indicate that the number of 
board members of public firms in Indonesia is ranged between 2-13 persons, or an average of 5 board members 
of each firms.  The amount is still not too large boards size, so the interactions among them can still play an 
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effective role in providing expert advice and opinion in boardroom discussion, including the formulation of CSR 
policy.  
4.5. The Effect of Board Tenure on Corporate Social Disclosure. 
  The result of this study indicated that corporations which have board with long tenure tend to perform 
lower corporate social disclosure.  These results do not support the argument that high tenure director, related to 
lower negative social impact, and tend to build good relationship with workers.  The length of commissioner 
tenure, however, are not always able to represent the ethical policies better, because longer tenure board of 
commissioner can’t perform better function of oversight and control over the executives.  This argument is 
supported by Byrd et al.(2010) that long-term relationship between the board of commissioner and executives 
will increase agency problem and decrease the effectiveness board’s oversight function to management.  In line 
argument reveals by Vafeas (2003) in management friendliness hypothesis which states that board of 
commissioner with long tenure (long tenure board) tend to have a close relationship with management that 
makes the board less effective in monitoring management behavior.  Although the long tenure and experience is 
able to better understanding of corporate business environment, but it must be observed cautiously that long-term 
relationship will weaken the function of supervision and control over the executive.  This condition causes the 
board can’t serve optimally in directing the strategy and policy for long-term corporate sustainability.  
    
5. Conclusions  
Board of commissioners play an important role in setting strategy and policy formulation related to the corporate 
social responsibility implementation.  Policies made by board of commissioners are expected not only focus on 
short-term for profit, but also oriented towards to long-term corporate sustainability.  The diversity of board of 
commissioner is required to improve decision-making and to enhance the corporate image through the 
commitment of equality opportunity, and also to increase representation in moral view and ethical decision 
making process.  Moreover, board diversity may be reducing narrow perspective and enhancing new ideas and 
better problem solving, including improving strategic planning and accountability of CSR implementation.  
Exploration of board diversity is able to play a strategic role of CSR in the formulation of company policy which 
not only priority the interest of particular stakeholder group, but is also able to maintain a certain equality in the 
relationship between stakeholders.  Therefore setting the precise composition on the board diversity through the 
exploration and internalization of board age, board size, board gender and board tenure is crucial issue that is 
required for the successful of board management.  
Corporate needs to maintain the proportion of older boards in the corporate board as more likely to 
implement governance structures and processes relating to the environment so as to ensure the corporate 
sustainability in long-term.  Although larger board can provide a number of experienced boards that represent 
substantial diversity of experience, expertise, skills, values that represent diversity of boards, but it should be 
observed carefully that the higher coordination costs and larger boards are less active in overseeing negative 
impact of corporate on the community. Another improvement to be scrutinized is related to the board gender and 
board tenure on corporate board.  The role of board gender needs an crucial attention, due to the low number of 
female board was not able to give better concern to the corporate stakeholder’s welfare and realize the corporate 
behavior that provide better benefits for society and environmental. Meanwhile, the presence and proportion of 
board independence is more due to meet regulatory pressures from capital market than corporate social 
responsibility aspect towards the stakeholder, so that have not been able to encourage ethical corporate culture 
such as corporate social responsibility implementation.  Therefore, an increasing the number of female board is 
expected to encourage ethical corporate behavior such as CSR.  Furthermore, board tenure arrangements require 
critical consideration. On the one hand, long board tenure will increase the interaction of board member, provide 
experience and a better understanding of corporate business environment as well as commitment and better 
competence in managing corporation. However, on the other hand, the long tenure board will increase agency 
problems and weaken the oversight function on executive that potentially undermine governance, including in 
the stakeholder interests to ensure long-term corporate sustainability. In order to avoid the negative aspects of 
long tenure board, it is necessary to evaluate and review the tenure of board periodically. 
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